

30 April 2013

Advice to the European Medicines Agency from the Clinical trial Advisory Group on Rules of engagement (CTAG3)

Draft Advice Version 7.2 – Clean version of 7.1

1 Advice to the European Medicines Agency on rules of 2 engagement for accessing clinical trial data

3 Draft – 22 March 2013 - Version 7.2

4 **This advisory group discussed the issues and questions listed below and offers the**
5 **following views and positions for EMA's consideration: 1. Should the marketing**
6 **authorisation holder be consulted before EMA discloses clinical trial data, in regards of**
7 **commercial confidential information (CCI)? What elements of the clinical part of the**
8 **dossier could be considered CCI?**

9 No agreement was reached. The following positions were discussed:

10 a. EMA should only disclose confidential commercial information from non-clinical and clinical study
11 reports and patient level data when there is an overriding public interest reason for doing so, under
12 conditions which serve that interest. The EMA should always consult with the marketing
13 authorisation holder (MAH) prior to disclosure, to allow the MAH to take any necessary steps to
14 protect against unfair competition and/ or prejudice to regulatory data protection, patent or other
15 IP rights.

16 Although the situations would be rare (perhaps when working with a new therapeutic class or a
17 rare disease) it is possible that eCTDs and CSRs would contain competitively valuable information.
18 The sorts of information (with historical examples that are no longer competitively relevant) are:

19 - Methods to pursue newly validated / devised endpoints that are persuasive to regulators:

20 e.g., the suite of validated measurements for assessing the effects of migraine on the whole
21 body in support of the first approval of the prototypical 5HT1B/1D agonist sumatriptan p.o. and s.c.

22 - Identification of investigators that recruit well, especially for rare diseases / difficult patient
23 populations:

24 e.g., those with sufficient patients to support a clinical trial in cluster headache as a new
25 indication for s.c. sumatriptan

26 - A novel trial design, streamlining and making more economical the proof of efficacy for an
27 acutely acting compound: e.g., Armitage (adaptive) design that was novel and supported the
28 approval of i.v. dantrolene

29 - CSRs may contain information on bio-analytical product-characterization methods which are the
30 intellectual property of the MAH - public disclosure could be an infringement of the MAH's IP rights.
31 Furthermore, the use of some specific analytical tests described in the CSR can provide information
32 indicative of the active product substance/molecule that can therefore be identified and used by
33 competitor companies (e.g. tests on molecule-specific epitopes providing information allowing
34 identification of the commercial confidential molecule).

35 Commercial sensitivity resides in the effect of EMA's intent to release clinical trial data on products
36 that rely on data protection laws to prevent generic competition in other territories. In other words,
37 of particular concern with the proposed proactive broad disclosure of clinical trial data is the
38 potential for inappropriate use of such data by third parties either to circumvent existing regulatory

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39 data protection (RDP) rules, or take advantage of the absence of such rules in the many countries
40 which do not have robust systems of RDP equivalent to that in the EU. For instance, data
41 exclusivity in Australia, China and Mexico is directly undermined by publication of the relevant
42 data, anywhere in the world.

43 Industry contends that if data are obtained from EMA under its disclosure policy and used lawfully
44 in a third country then the EU MAH would have no legal redress.

45 However, even if a CCI was defined (additional concrete cases must be provided), open access
46 should be restricted ONLY for this sensitive part of the CSR. Moreover, EMA consultations to MAH
47 should not imply long delays in releasing data.

48

49 b. EMA's consultation with the marketing authorisation holder (MAH) prior to disclosure may
50 introduce delays that detract from the concept of "proactive" disclosure. Whether or not a
51 particular material can be disclosed, and under what terms, should be decided prior to readying
52 materials for disclosure.

53 With regards to the examples of CCI listed above: Some of the examples should nowadays not be
54 legitimate examples of commercial sensitivity. At the time these drugs were being developed, they
55 may have been thought to be legitimate examples simply because of the way drug development
56 was done then. Today, these examples should be regarded as being examples that overall make
57 clinical development more efficient and as such should be shared. Furthermore, if the new method,
58 endpoint... is an argument for the approval, it should be made publicly available in the EPAR and
59 properly described in any guideline applying to the evaluation of products in the indication.

60 It is emphasised that "competitively valuable information" is not necessarily CCI. For example, a
61 negative study result is obviously competitively valuable information, but this should not make it
62 CCI.

63 Study methods and study results are never CCI. The information is essential for the interpretation
64 of the study results and should be available for the public. EMA's policy will ensure that this will be
65 done only after a decision about marketing authorisation has been made.

66 Third-party requestors may need some of this "competitively sensitive" information to carry out
67 proper re-analysis and verification of results, such as trial protocols, but may not necessarily need
68 all of them (e.g. identification of investigators that recruit well). Most of the information on 'good
69 investigators' in CTD and CRS will also be available in publications.

70 Identity of investigators should always be public in order to make clear any conflicts of interest
71 between MAH and professionals.

72

73 Note from EMA: stakeholders are invited to specifically comment on the question: What elements
74 of the clinical part of the dossier could be considered CCI?

75

76 The questions listed below addressed the issue: what steps will a requester have to go through
77 before being able to access clinical trial data from the EMA website? After accessing the dedicated
78 domain of the EMA website:

79 **2. Should requesters have to identify themselves?**

80 It is useful to distinguish between access to (1) aggregate data (e.g. lists of studies conducted, ICH
81 compliant clinical study reports including the study protocol, statistical analysis plan and other
82 appendices, but excluding patient level data) and (2) patient-level data (e.g. individual case record
83 forms, SAS files with line listings).

84 1. Aggregate data: No agreement was reached. The following positions were discussed:

85 a. There is no convincing rationale that identification of requesters could or should be
86 required. Such data should be accessible freely (similar to EPAR information today).
87 It is assumed that aggregate data contains no or few personal data (any personally
88 identifiable information must be removed prior to release unless justified to
89 remain). It is pointed out that the aim of transparency shouldn't be only to allow a
90 potential reanalysis. For example, drug independent bulletins need full information
91 of clinical trials not for research purposes but for education purposes in health
92 areas. A watchdog activity is high useful to citizens and also for drug regulatory
93 bodies. So in many cases there won't be a "legitimate scientific question" to be
94 considered. Transparency goes beyond reanalysis purposes.

95 b. In the interest of transparency, requesters should be identified, logged and their
96 identity made public, primarily to ensure patient confidentiality is not compromised
97 and to avoid the misuse of patient level data by third parties with commercial
98 interests that are not related to healthcare research. It is technically possible to
99 accurately identify requesters; one could perhaps use an ORCID ID to identify
100 requesters.

101

102 2. Patient-level data: No agreement was reached. The following positions were discussed:

103 a. These data should be freely accessible without the need for identification.

104 Arguments in favour of this position include (not in order of importance):

105 i. Lowering the hurdle for patients who wish to access data related to their
106 own disease. Asking requesters to publicly share their personal details,
107 education and training before getting access would violate data protection
108 regulations and induce a hurdle for non-professional user groups. Also, the
109 rules of engagement should not include any pre-selection or pre-
110 identification and publication of the requester name for a simple reason: a
111 patient can ask for the data about a product he has to take for his/her
112 disease. If specific qualifications are requested, one will easily know who
113 are the requesters with a personal interest in the product (those without
114 clear qualifications).

115 ii. Proper verification of identity of the requester is near-impossible;

116 iii. If the data are used for illegal actions such as illegitimate commercial use,
117 there are legal actions which can be taken against the firm/country
118 benefiting from the illegal action. Thus, this point should not be an
119 argument to force requester-identification. Furthermore, if someone wishes
120 the data for illegal action, he will surely and easily use a wrong

- 121 identification or could only ask others to also request data in order to
122 increase the number of suspects;
- 123 iv. Any patient-level data that EMA makes available will be de-
124 identified/anonymised, therefore the risk of retro-active patient
125 identification is considered acceptably low, and the patient data protection
126 is not an issue (it is argued that there is even no need to distinguish
127 between aggregate data and patient level data). Therefore, there is no
128 need to verify the identity of the requester (*Note: reference is made to*
129 *CTAG1, which is discussing standards for de-identification/anonymisation to*
130 *ensure patient data protection*);
- 131 v. There are cases of harassment by pharmaceutical industry when a
132 physician declared an adverse event to an agency (example: Dr Chiche in
133 Marseilles about the Mediator story). If the name of the requesters is given
134 to EMA, how will EMA make sure that the name of the requester will not be
135 known by the Marketing Authorisation Holder? In case of harassment linked
136 to a data request, what would be EMA's responsibility?
- 137 vi. Any suggestion that requestors of clinical trial data should also have
138 sufficient qualifications and experience for any subsequent analysis of data
139 is neither practical nor desirable for either aggregate data or patient-level
140 data. It would entail subjective and arbitrary judgements about what
141 qualifications and experience are "sufficient".
- 142 vii. The privacy of study participants is important and their privacy should be
143 warranted. On the other hand, the privacy should also be warranted for
144 study participants, patients or other (EU) citizens who like to access
145 patient-level data for their own private use. Namely, publication of their
146 name on the internet involves the risk of unintended use of the personal
147 data of this person, especially if this information can be detected by search
148 engines such as Google. For example, the information (name + type of
149 medication) may be detected during a background search performed for a
150 job application; the information can be used by insurance companies; or
151 the information can be used for direct marketing for registered or falsified
152 medicines, including spamming. This is an argument to carefully consider
153 whether the benefits of publication of the names of private persons
154 outweigh the risks of unintended use and breach of privacy of those who
155 access data. Thus, benefits of publication of the names of those who access
156 patient level data may not outweigh the risks, because publication of
157 personal data in combination with (type of) medicines for which data have
158 been accessed creates the possibility for unintended and undesirable use of
159 personal data;
- 160 viii. As data would be anonymous there is no sensitive data. Retrospective
161 patient identification cannot be prevented by verifying the identity of the
162 requester, nor can any violator necessarily be identified through such
163 knowledge as there will usually be no conclusive link between the violation
164 and the requester. We should keep in mind article 6.1. b and c. in directive
165 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October

- 166 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
167 personal data and on the free movement of such data. Pursuant to this
168 article collection of data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in
169 relation to the purposes. Registering the requester is also processing of
170 personal data and should only be done for legitimate reasons and should
171 not be excessive in relation to the purpose.
- 172 ix. Concerns about inappropriate analyses are misplaced, since the scientific
173 community will or will not give their support to these analysis based on its
174 scientific value.
- 175 b. These data should be freely accessible only after verification of the identity of the
176 requester. Arguments in favour of this position include (not in order of
177 importance):
- 178 i. Patient-level data is too sensitive to allow anonymous requesters to access
179 because the risk of retrospective patient identification is never zero. The
180 legal liability associated with the release of the patient data from a data
181 privacy perspective needs to be considered. There is reference to the risk of
182 retro-active patient identification being “acceptably low”, yet that still
183 presents a risk to patient identification. Legal accountability needs to be
184 addressed if a patient is in fact identified and this is used improperly
185 against an individual patient;
- 186 ii. The level of de-identification required to render patient-level data suitable
187 for open public access is likely to seriously compromise the utility of that
188 data for the purpose of research in the interest of public health. Much of
189 the value of analysis of patient-level data over aggregate data is the ability
190 to link and take account of patient characteristics in analyses. For example,
191 if age and gender were to be removed from the dataset, it would not be
192 possible to investigate possible treatment interactions with these
193 characteristics or with these in combination with other characteristics that
194 remain in the dataset. If dates are removed this reduces scope for scrutiny
195 and (unless replaced with a series of derived times from event to event)
196 precludes time to event analyses. This would mean, for example, that
197 survival analyses in cancer trials would not be possible. This is an important
198 consideration for individual participant data systematic (IPD) reviews and
199 meta-analyses. Re-consider whether tiered access is feasible. Open public
200 access for all documentation including clinical study reports, results, and
201 aggregate data. Access to IPD restricted to being for the purpose of
202 research in the interest of public health - as demonstrated by provision of a
203 protocol or research plan, disclosure of investigator name and affiliation
204 and declaration of any potential conflict of interest (preferably at the point
205 of release of data, but delayed if necessary);
- 206 iii. Strict assurances about the specific use of personal data are given as part
207 of the consent process to trial entry; they do not include release except
208 under strict rules. Release of individual patient data, even anonymised,
209 contravenes the information provided as part of the consent process, and
210 thereby infringes human rights.

- 211 iv. It is possible (and will be even easier in the future) to combine anonymised
212 data sets with other data that is readily available publically to identify
213 individuals. This is important for privacy particularly as the data contains
214 health information that can be sensitive and assumed to be private by the
215 clinical trial participant. For example please see :
216 [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788732378370457824784249](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323783704578247842499724794.html)
217 9724794.html and the original article 'Identifying Personal Genomes by
218 Surname Inference. Melissa Gymrek et al. Science 339:321, 2013'.
- 219 v. Requesters of patient-level clinical trial data should also have sufficient
220 qualifications and experience for any subsequent analysis of data obtained
221 from clinical trials, as aligned with ICH-E9 and 'statistical principles for
222 clinical trials'. Also, in order for any analysis of data obtained from clinical
223 trials, there should be a legitimate scientific question being proposed in
224 order for the request for data access to be considered. Requesters should
225 not only identify themselves, but they should also provide details of their
226 qualifications and experience which supports they are sufficiently educated
227 and trained to implement any subsequent analysis of the data being
228 requested. This information should be made transparent by the requester
229 at the time of seeking access to data.
- 230 vi. There is a risk of illegitimate commercial use of patient-level data (please
231 refer to **point 3**). To mitigate this risk the identity of the requester must be
232 verified;
- 233 vii. The identity of the requester should be available and public. It is widely
234 accepted in science that people have to disclose their financial interest. This
235 principle should be applied here as well;
- 236 viii. The objective is clearly to restore trust in the system, not to create an all-
237 purpose research tool. Patient data is not to be diverted to research
238 purposes for which it was never intended or to "data mining", be it
239 academic or commercial. Such misuse could otherwise lead to false claims
240 of efficacy and safety of medicines. The EMA has previously stated the
241 objective is to "(...) enable the independent re-analysis of the evidence
242 used by the Agency's committees to determine their benefits and risks and
243 is expected to lead to public-health benefits." The access process should be
244 developed with this public health principle in mind;
- 245 ix. It is not clear how providing patients access to data relating to their own
246 disease is aligned with the remit of access to data which is being able to
247 independently re-analyse the benefit-risks. Anyone wishing to re-analyse
248 data should have minimal qualifications and expertise and it should not be
249 suggested that individuals who are not equipped with the relevant skills
250 should attempt to re-analyse data.
- 251 x. It should be recognised that clinical trial participants are providing sensitive
252 health information while those who are accessing anonymised data would
253 not be required to provide sensitive health information. For example they
254 would only be required to provide their name, address and research

- 255 institution. It is also difficult to understand why the name of a
256 researcher/requester who accessed data for a particular disease would
257 result in insurance or any other consequence. Merely accessing the data
258 does not indicate or suggest that the individual has that disease or
259 condition. In addition if an email address is not made public (and there is
260 no reason to do so) there is little or no risk of spamming.
- 261 xi. There is also a risk of other unintended consequences: Some requesters
262 may present out-of-context results that would lead to false impressions of
263 drug safety issues and lead to unfounded health scares (e.g.
264 <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/6>). This risk is of high
265 importance to the ultimate decision of whether patient level data should
266 have open access and the long term consequences should be discussed.
267 However, sometimes it's in fact the opposite. Some requesters use data
268 from drug regulatory agencies to minimize unfounded health scares with
269 potential harms in other senses: for example, the PPI-Clopidogrel
270 interaction case:
271 <http://www.nature.com/ajg/journal/v106/n7/full/ajg2011126a.html>
- 272 xii. If a requestor uses data for an illegitimate use, is the EMA liable for failing
273 to protect patient confidentiality? There is no secure path forward when
274 granting control to anyone to secure patient confidentiality. Industry can do
275 certain measures to ensure that data confidentiality is given within a
276 dataset. But there is no measure available to secure this when a requester
277 has access to the clinical trial data for the purpose to re-analyse it, as they
278 would then have the potential to merge the clinical trial data with other
279 available data. The only way to secure patient confidentiality is to have a
280 step that checks the request for access is scientific (good intent) and clear
281 rules noting that data cannot be further disseminated. If the rules require
282 the uploading of a protocol or analysis plan then this using a restrictive
283 access approach increases the protection against unintended use of the
284 data. The policy will need to clarify who is liable for any illegitimate use of
285 data.
- 286 xiii. Although the identity of the requester indeed should be known to the
287 database owner, it is not conclusive to request publication of these names
288 and addresses.
- 289 c. Several types of compromises could be envisaged: For access, a hierarchy for
290 different user groups should be foreseen with access to different types of data. For
291 the EMA pharmacovigilance database, such an access policy already exists.
292 (EMA/759287/2009 corr., EudraVigilance access policy for medicines for human
293 use) This paper is adopted after consultation with the Patients' and Consumers'
294 Working Party and consultation with the Health Care Professional Working Group.
295 The paper defines 4 types of stakeholder groups:
- 296 • Medicines Regulatory Authorities, the European Commission and the
297 Agency (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group I)

- 298
- 299
- Healthcare Professionals and the General Public (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group II)
- 300
- Marketing Authorisation Holders and Sponsors of Clinical Trials
- 301
- (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group III)
- 302
- Research Organisations (hereafter referred to as Stakeholder Group IV)

303 There is a need to modify the categories according to an optional user identification
304 process, granting access to e.g. patient level after authorisation. If hierarchy for
305 different user groups were finally considered, healthcare professionals should have
306 access to the higher possible level of information. This would also allow for the
307 processes discussed under topics 3, 4 and 6, setting reminders or making
308 registered users aware of possible consequences after misuse.

309 Those specific trials should be identified where retroactive patient identification is a
310 risk, and alternatives should be provided for these cases to harmonize patient and
311 health professional rights. For example, access to data on clinical studies conducted
312 in patients with rare diseases should be restricted and treated under different
313 provisions, such as mandatory registration and identity verification of the
314 requestor, and contractual agreements covering the consequences of misuse and/or
315 inadvertent identification.

316 Alternatively, open access could be granted for aggregate anonymised data and
317 restricted access for patient level data where access is controlled by EMA.

318 Consider differentiating between requests for data to "independently re-analyse
319 trial data" and requests for data to be used in "secondary analysis to address new
320 clinical questions" and how this could determine the level of data access required.
321 The complexity of taking patient level data and all the associated meta-data should
322 be noted, and this complexity could lead to incorrect analyses being generated
323 unless appropriate checks are put in place to deal with such situations.

324 Note whether it would be feasible for the EMA themselves to re-analyse patient-
325 level trial data to address the "independent re-analysis" of trial data. If this
326 approach was possible, this could lead to granting open access to aggregate
327 anonymised data, and EMA and other nominated stakeholders considered
328 "independent" to access to patient level data.

329 It is also noted that in order to allow for public access to patient-level data in the future, they
330 would have to be a mandatory part of the clinical submission documents, and reflected in the
331 relevant CHMP guideline documents such as CHMP/EWP/2998/03. Furthermore, the potential use of
332 patient-level data outside of the clinical study scope should be covered in the study informed
333 consent form such that the subject agrees to the future "secondary use" of patient-level data
334 outside of the study scope.

335 **3. Should requesters be required to 'Agree' to respect personal data protection?**

336 It is agreed that this point is only relevant for patient-level data.

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337 It is agreed that any requirement for the requester to actively agree to respect personal data
338 protection would depend on whether the identity of the requester can be/has been verified. (No
339 agreement was reached on that point, see above)

340 If the identity of the requester has not been verified (two positions):

341 a) Without requester identification, such `agreement` to respect personal data protection is
342 only for information, but cannot be legally binding. As far as CTAG1 rules for patient data
343 anonymisation are applied and effective, respect of personal data protection mainly forbids
344 linking the data obtained from EMA with other databases/information.

345 b) Even if the identity of a requester cannot be verified, a disclaimer about the need for
346 personal data protection should be "read and accepted" by the requester.

347 If the identity of the requester has been verified:

348 Should it be/have been possible to verify the identity of the requester, and the requester actively
349 agrees to respect personal data protection, any violation of this agreement should be legally
350 enforceable.

351 Requesters have to be made aware of EU and local data protection regulations. Ticking a box
352 implies a contractual relationship between the requester and the database owner/holder of the
353 data. However, in that case both contractual parties need to be fully identifiable. A contractual but
354 not necessarily public "digital" agreement appears to be preferable compared to a purely
355 anonymous process.

356 Details of a contractual agreement should clarify that if any individuals are provided access to
357 clinical trial data, then the holders of the data cannot be held accountable in any way for what the
358 requesters subsequently do with the data; any re-analysis of the data is at the responsibility of the
359 requester. If subsequent issues are found with respect to an incorrect re-analysis, misuse of the
360 data for purposes outside of the research proposal originally specified, or any potential fraudulent
361 behaviour, the original owner of the source data cannot be held accountable in any way.

362 **4. Should the requester be required to 'Agree' to refrain from unintended**
363 **commercial uses of information retrieved?**

364 There is general agreement that EMA's policy on Access to clinical trial data should further the
365 interest of public health, but should not abet usage of data for unintended commercial uses such as
366 obtaining a marketing authorisation in a third, non-EU, jurisdiction. EMA's policy should attempt to
367 mitigate this risk without compromising transparency. The option of requiring anonymous data
368 requesters to tick a 'read and accepted' tick box is considered ineffectual.

369 No agreement was reached on the following point (two positions):

370 a) The requester should be required to sign a legally binding agreement affirming that the
371 information and data will only be used for the agreed public health research purpose and
372 not for any commercial use. Requests for patient level data from requesters to the EMA
373 must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and follow consistent criteria to establish if and
374 how the information provided will be used for valid scientific purposes and to benefit
375 patients. (Please refer to discussion of CCI under Question 1)

376 b) It is unclear which situations we are talking about and "unintended commercial uses" may
377 be used as a "killer argument". For example, if industry fears that one cannot exclude that
378 a full CSR may be used for obtaining a marketing authorisation in a non-EU jurisdiction,
379 this may prevent full transparency. The relationship between knowledge and profit-making
380 is too complex to have it be contractually bound during the data release process; there is
381 no simple distinction between using data for public health research and commercial use.
382 The party suggesting a legally binding contract requiring the requestor to guarantee to use
383 the data for public health purposes and not commercial purposes, should be clarified as to
384 how commercial purposes and public health purposes will be defined and disentangled in
385 practice.

386 **5. Should the requester be made aware of quality standards for additional /**
387 **secondary analyses?**

388 No agreement was reached on this point (two positions):

389 a) It is emphasised that advising requesters of quality standards for additional secondary analyses
390 should not and cannot impose any obligations on the requester. However, it would be
391 appropriate to ask EMA to communicate their quality standards when a public statement is
392 issued. (*Note: Reference is made to the work of CTAG4*).

393 The use of such advice is questioned. This may discourage non-professional users from
394 downloading and using such data. There is no benefit from such advice but it may mean a
395 subjective additional hurdle to lay groups/patients.

396 b) The requester should be advised of quality standards for additional secondary analyses.
397 The same standards must be applied equally to the requester as would be applied to the
398 MAH. It is emphasised that such advice should imply clear obligations on the requester.

399 **6. Should the requester have to declare whether they wish to upload a protocol /**
400 **analysis plan?**

401 There is agreement that good scientific practise requires those who wish to engage in secondary
402 data analysis to complete and submit a study protocol before accessing the data. Therefore, the
403 opportunity (but not obligation) to upload a protocol on an EMA managed repository is welcomed.
404 There was no consensus as to the time of publication of such uploaded protocols. Options discussed
405 were:

- 406 a) Immediately after uploading the protocol
- 407 b) After a fixed time span (e.g. 1 month, 1 year?)
- 408 c) Around the time of publication of the results of secondary analysis
- 409 d) Timing of publication decided by requester

410 Several comments/views along the following lines were expressed:

411 A requester should have to submit a protocol or analysis plan before being granted access to the
412 data as this enables full transparency of the purpose and intention for requesting access to the
413 data and this helps to minimise any misuse by third parties. In order to ensure there is a legitimate

414 research question(s) being proposed, pre-specifying the clinical hypotheses to be investigated
415 ensures the scientific credibility of the research to be undertaken.

416 The process to be followed could be tailored to the remit for the request for access to data -
417 independent re-analysis versus secondary analyses of existing data.

418 A protocol could be either uploaded or provided as link to a "trial register". An (ethics committee)
419 review of the protocol should be provided by the requester.

420 Provision of a protocol demonstrating good research methods, fair use of data and the purpose to
421 which it will be put seems an entirely reasonable exchange for access to data. There seems to be a
422 danger of introducing double standards with requirement for access to clinical trial protocols and
423 clinical trial data, but not to protocols for subsequent use. For IPD, make provision of a protocol
424 (with delayed public access if necessary) a prerequisite for access to or release of data. A link to a
425 formally published protocol would be acceptable. Protocols should be given a unique identifier,
426 which is also quoted in each publication that arises from the analyses.

427 The protocol must be reviewed before the patient level data is provided.

428 **7. Should requesters be allowed to share accessed data?**

429 It was agreed that this would become uncontrollable in case identification of the requester is not
430 verifiable.

431 No agreement was reached on the following point of sharing data (two positions):

432 a) Should it be/have been possible to verify the identity of the requester, EMA may consider
433 restricting data sharing. However, in such case any third party would have to be given
434 access to the same data as the first requester directly from the EMA. If a collaboration
435 between 2 requesters is necessary (e.g. Academia + industry or data management
436 company), EMA should be informed and give approval. This can be anticipated in the
437 analysis plan.

438 b) Requesters should not be allowed to share accessed data because that way the validity of
439 the dataset cannot be controlled. Requestors will be responsible for the security of the data
440 they gain access to. Without this accountability, the sharing of data could quickly become
441 widespread; this can be avoided if requesters have restricted access to data sets in a
442 controlled system. Requesters should need to explicitly confirm that they will not forward
443 the downloaded original dataset to third parties. It is acknowledged that others must be
444 able to repeat research findings; that is a basic principle of research. However, such groups
445 would then have to identify themselves separately before accessing the same data.

446 c) The validity of the dataset cannot be controlled in any way; everybody can alter the
447 original dataset once it is released by the drug agency. So the ban of sharing data is
448 useless.

449 **8. How should EMA's policy be rolled out (timelines)?**

450 There was brief discussion as to whether the policy should be rolled out in a staggered way,
451 starting with high-level (aggregated) data, followed by more granular (patient-level) data sets. No
452 conclusion was reached (three positions).

453 a) If the name of the requester is not needed for aggregated data, then most points do not
454 need further discussion. A staggered roll-out should not delay implementation of the rules
455 to make data publicly available.

456 There is no obvious benefit and no reason to use a staggered way other than limited
457 capacity. Hence, there is no reason to postpone access to patient-level data

458 b) A staggered roll-out would be preferable as there are already many challenges to opening
459 up access to aggregated data which need to be solved. Aligning with the roll-out of the
460 EudraCT version 9 and access to results for many clinical trials could be an important step
461 forward. Aggregated data, after consultation with the MAH for removal of CCI and PPD, is
462 more likely to have value to a wider audience and therefore should be of initial focus. A
463 staggered roll-out should be done by running several pilots to evaluate potential issues.

464 c) A staggered approach would be pragmatic and could achieve much almost immediately.
465 There are many issues around the release of IPD, particularly around open public access
466 versus some model of conditional access. If this could be set aside for now with focus on
467 release of aggregate data and results of all statistical analyses as set out in the trial
468 protocol, rapid progress could be made. Access to IPD could follow after sufficient time for
469 discussion and enquiry. For example, potential impact of public release of IPD on
470 participant consent needs to be investigated. Therefore, separate the issues of (1) release
471 and access to trial information, results and aggregate data from (2) release and access to
472 IPD, and move ahead immediately with 1. Do not delay implementation of 1 while 2 is
473 addressed (it is much more complex and requires careful consideration). Extend the time
474 period to allow proper consideration and investigation of issues pertaining to 2. However,
475 the delay of the access to IPD should only be delayed for a short time - one year.

476 **9. Should requesters be encouraged to provide feedback?**

477 There is agreement that users of data should be encouraged to link back the results of their
478 analyses to the accessed data in order to ensure two-way transparency.

479 While a link back of results of individual analyses is desirable, it should be located on a separate
480 database in order to not increase subjective hurdles to lay people. This database should/could be
481 linked to the database of analysis plans/protocols.

482 It may also be useful to add a user/log-in concept to the repository to allow requesters to build
483 project websites. These project websites would give requesters the opportunity to publish
484 timelines, the protocol and the results of their project (or links to such documents).

485 Several comments/views along the following lines were expressed:

- 486 • Just encouraging requesters to link their analyses back to the data accessed is not
487 sufficient. Further discussion is needed on how any resulting publications arising from
488 secondary analyses are linked back to data access requests. Principles should be included
489 on minimal expectations of requesters and what should be fed back having been granted
490 access to data. For example, should the requester have to summarise their key findings of
491 their analyses as a minimum? Publishing has to be accepted not only in the form of articles
492 in journals but also as other documents with open access from the internet.

30 April 2013

Advice to the European Medicines Agency from the Clinical trial Advisory Group
on Rules of engagement (CTAG3)

Draft Advice Version 7.2 – Clean version of 7.1

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- EMA should be committed to comment / answer in some way whatever new evidence brought up by requesters after its analysis.
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- On the assumption that access to anonymised patient level data is granted for a defined research project, access to a secure area should be granted for a defined duration (the duration necessary to complete the project). An open-ended access (beyond the research project) would undermine the benefits of identification and declaration of research purposes. Requesters should be given a time frame within which they are obliged to publish/make public any outcomes and conclusions resulting from their analyses.
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- Requestors should be required to make publications derived from this work open access either via a journal or via deposition in a publicly available repository within 12 months of the completion of the work and a copy of the work supplied to EMA.
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- There should be no requirement for a time frame within which requestors are obliged to publish/make public the results of their analysis. However, if the EMA is constructing a database that will showcase the requests that have come in, also indicating which parties accessed what data, it would be nice to also include space for requestors to not only say what outcomes have resulted from their analysis (e.g. publications) but also encourage requestors who did not publish any resulting analyses to explain the reasons for no publication.
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